

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETIETH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 16 June 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

U SAIN BWA

(Burma)

64-15341

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
Miss L. de VINCENZI
Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. G. GHELEV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV
Mr. I. BOEV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA
U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. R.M. TAIT
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. V. PECHOTA
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
Mr. Manuel TELLO
Mr. J. MERCADO

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mr. P. LIND

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN

Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH

Mr. V.M. BASKAKOV

Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN

Mr. J.K. WRIGHT

Mr. J.M. EDES

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I declare open the one hundred and ninetieth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I should like to welcome back to the Conference Mr. Kurka, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia.

Before calling upon the speakers today I should like to say as Chairman, on behalf of the members of the Committee, how deeply shocked we are to learn of the sudden death of Ambassador Charles Stelle, who so long and so ably represented his country at the Disarmament Conference. His great interest in and dedication to disarmament bore fruit when, in the month of June 1963 in the Palais des Nations, he signed on behalf of the United States Government the memorandum of understanding between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the establishment of a direct communications link (ENDC/97). As one of the principal negotiators on behalf of the United States Government for several years, he also participated in the signing of the partial test ban treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1).

His death is a great loss, not only to his Government and, above all, to his family, but to all of us engaged in the work of negotiating disarmament. I should like to ask the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to rise for a moment in tribute to the memory of Charles Stelle.

The representatives stood in silence.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): Some representatives have indicated their desire to speak in tribute to the memory of the late Ambassador Charles Stelle.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): It is with deep sorrow Mr. Chairman, that I associate myself with the sentiments you have expressed on the death -- which has astonished and grieved us all -- of Ambassador Charles Stelle, a veteran of this Conference and a colleague esteemed and appreciated by all. No one who, like myself, had the pleasure of knowing him and working with him will ever forget the exceptional qualities of this eminent representative of the United States, nor his sincere devotion to the cause of disarmament and peace.

Mr. Stelle's sudden death while still in the prime of life is as you said, Mr. Chairman, a great loss to the United States Government, to which he could have continued to render valuable services for a long time yet. It is, however, also a very sad loss for all his friends, and for me in particular.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I would ask the United States delegation to be so good as to transmit my most sincere condolences to the United States Government, to Mrs. Stelle, and to all the other members of his family; for the whole Italian delegation, including myself, will always remember with deep respect and sincere affection our friend who left us at such an untimely hour.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, following upon the observations made by you and by our Italian colleague I should like to tell our United States colleagues how shocked and grieved we in the United Kingdom delegation were to learn last week of the untimely death of Ambassador Charles Stelle.

All of us in this Conference -- and I say "all of us" deliberately -- recognized his untiring devotion to the cause of disarmament, his readiness in debate and his fertile work behind the scenes, for long periods as one of our co-Chairmen, in the search for ways of advancing our work.

If you will allow me a personal note, Ambassador Stelle, Ambassador Tsarapkin and I were among the original representatives at the three-Power Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests when it began its work in October 1958. Both then and later I and my colleagues on United Kingdom delegations learned the value of Ambassador Stelle's clear-headed and realistic approach to problems and of his unfailing readiness to spend himself in our joint work. We have lost a dear friend and colleague, but I am glad to think that Charlie could see some light on the horizon before he died.

We extend our deep sympathy to our United States colleagues, to whom I should be grateful if they would assure Mrs. Stelle that we sorrow with her in her great loss.

Mr. OSMAN (United Arab Republic): I should like to associate my delegation with the expression of profound grief made on the death of Mr. Stelle. There is no need for me to elaborate on either the able way in which he led his country's delegation or his valuable contribution to our work and deliberations. His successful efforts in the negotiations for the "hot line" agreement and the partial test ban treaty are now a matter of record. His keen interest in the cause of disarmament and his intimate knowledge of its problems were an asset to this Conference. Those who worked with the late Mr. Stelle and who knew him personally

(Mr. Osman, United Arab Republic)

will always remember his charming personality, his infinite courtesy and the friendliness he continually extended to them. We should like to express our sincere sympathy to the United States delegation.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation also wishes to offer its sympathy to the United States delegation on the untimely death of Charles Stelle, our colleague during the first two years of this Conference. There is little to add to the well-deserved tributes paid by Secretary of State Rusk and those others that have been pronounced by speakers before me today. Charles Stelle's name should be remembered with gratitude for the leading part he played in achieving the agreement on the direct communications link between Washington and Moscow, and the nuclear test ban treaty of 5 August 1963, which we all hope will constitute the first step towards a safer and peaceful world.

The Canadian delegation, like other delegations, would ask the United States delegation kindly to extend our sympathy to Mr. Stelle's family.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Permit me also to offer on behalf of the Delegation of the Soviet Union our sympathy to the United States delegation on the untimely death of Ambassador Charles Stelle, who for a long time represented the United States of America at the three-Power negotiations in Geneva on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. Stelle's efforts found their expression in the work of the three-Power Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, and part of his work has remained in the actual conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in three environments.

Although we were not in agreement with Mr. Stelle on a number of questions, we must frankly state that his proficiency and the high level of his statements were beyond all doubt and his death is a loss.

We wish to join those who have expressed their condolences and sympathy both to the United States delegation and to Mr. Stelle's family.

Mr. LACHS (Poland): My delegation wishes to join the others in expressing our sadness and deep regret at the sudden and untimely death of Mr. Charles Stelle. As one of those who had the privilege of working with him, I learned to appreciate his devotion to duty and his able service to his country and to the cause for which he worked. Before leaving us he had the satisfaction of seeing his work bear fruit.

On behalf of the delegation of Poland, I wish to express our deep sympathy to the delegation of the United States and to the United States Government and request them to be good enough to convey our sympathy to the family of the deceased.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): When we learned the sad news of the sudden death of Ambassador Stelle, with whom we had worked together here in the Committee over a long period of time, we were deeply moved. Allow me, therefore, to address the United States delegation in order to express to it and, through it, to the family of the late Mr. Stelle the deepest sympathy of the Czechoslovak delegation.

The personality of Ambassador Charles Stelle was associated with the increased activity of our Committee, and for this reason we share your grief at the untimely death of our colleague, whose abilities and competence we always respected. I also beg Mr. Foster to accept the expression of our sincere condolence.

Mr. LUKOSE (India): May I, on behalf of the delegation of India, convey to the delegation of the United States of America our most sincere condolences on the tragic and premature departure of Mr. Stelle from our sphere of labours?

Those of my colleagues around this table who have been privileged to work with him have paid their tributes this morning -- tributes both to his qualities of head and to his qualities of heart. It remains for me only to say that my delegation and the Government of India would like to take this opportunity of expressing to the delegation of the United States our most sincere condolences. We trust that the United States delegation will kindly transmit our sense of great sorrow to Mrs. Stelle.

Ato TEFERRA (Ethiopia): I should like to associate my delegation with yourself, Mr. Chairman, and the other speakers in the expression of condolences at the sudden death of Mr. Stelle. Although I did not have the opportunity of working with him, I learned of his devotion, and of the sincere efforts which he made for the cause of disarmament and humanity, from my colleagues who did have the opportunity of working with him.

Once again I should like to express the wish of my delegation that the United States delegation convey our deep grief and sorrow to Mr. Stelle's family and to the Government of the United States.

Mr. DUMITRESCU (Romania) (translation from French): It is with profound sorrow that I associate my delegation with the condolences expressed here to the United States delegation on its sad loss through the premature demise of Ambassador Charles Stelle. The Romanian delegation always greatly appreciated his perfect urbanity, his great competence, his capacity for work in the service of the Committee, and his contribution to the agreements that have been mentioned. I would also ask the United States delegation to be so good as to transmit our sincere condolences to his family.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): I have asked for the floor only in order to express to the United States delegation our sincere condolences upon the untimely death of Ambassador Stelle. He has left us the memory of the great efforts he made over a good many years in the negotiations relating to disarmament. We sincerely ask the United States delegation to convey our condolences to its Government and to the family of the deceased.

Mr. GOMEZ ROBLEDO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): Like the previous speakers on this sad occasion, the Mexican delegation wishes to express its deep sorrow at the untimely death of Ambassador Stelle, whose services to the cause of peace were so well-known and who was in no lesser degree a great and good friend of Mexico. I wish to express our most sincere condolences to the United States delegation, and through it to Mr. Stelle's family.

Mr. OBI (Nigeria): My delegation would like to associate itself very warmly with those who have paid tribute to the memory of Ambassador Stelle.

It was indeed with genuine regret and shock that we learned last week of the untimely death of Charles Stelle. We had the most profound respect for him. As had been stated, Charles Stelle was a veteran of this Conference. But there is another point on which I should like to touch this morning. I refer to Ambassador Stelle's activities and efforts during the last session of the General Assembly towards arriving at a consensus in the First Committee. My delegation and, in particular, our permanent representative in New York have reason to value the experience, flexibility and courtesy of Charles Stelle.

I should be very grateful if the United States delegation and Government would accept the sincere condolences of my delegation, of myself and of our permanent representative in New York, who is now on leave in Nigeria. I should also be very grateful if the United States delegation would convey to Mrs. Stelle our sincere sympathy and great sense of loss.

Mr. CORREA do LAGO (Brazil) (translation from French): The delegation of Brazil wishes to express to the United States delegation its profound condolences on the death of Ambassador Charles Stelle. My delegation has always admired the role which Mr. Stelle played in this Committee. It is our conviction that he made an important contribution to the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty on the partial prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. I request the United States delegation to be so good as to convey to its Government and to Mr. Stelle's family the very sincere condolences of our delegation.

Mr. LIND (Sweden): The delegation of Sweden would like to join those who, this morning, have been paying a well-deserved tribute to Ambassador Charles Stelle. We should like to express our profound sympathy to the delegation of the United States, and should be grateful if that delegation would convey our condolences to Mrs. Stelle and her family.

Mr. PROTITCH (Special Representative of the Secretary-General): It is with deep emotion that I, too, wish to express our profound sorrow at the untimely death of Ambassador Charles Stelle.

Ambassador Stelle was an able and devoted representative of his country for many years in the disarmament negotiations. He first came to Geneva for the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. He was the deputy representative of his Government

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of the Secretary-General)

at the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and again at the present Conference. During his years of service in the disarmament negotiations he won the esteem and admiration of all his colleagues, and his loss will be felt by all who were privileged to know him.

On behalf of the Secretary-General and the members of the Disarmament Secretariat, I should like to extend our sincere condolences to the family of our former colleague and to the delegation of the United States in their sad loss.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I should now like to speak as representative of Burma. I would ask the delegation of the United States to convey to the family of the late Ambassador Charles Stelle the condolences of the delegation of Burma.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I should first like to thank everyone in this Committee for the personal tributes that have been paid to Ambassador Stelle and for the grief that has been expressed at what we all regard as a most untimely death. I feel sure that the warmth of the statements made here today will be a great comfort to Mrs. Stelle, as it is to us in the United States delegation.

Charles Stelle represented the United States at many meetings of this Conference and at the predecessor Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. As the representative of the United Kingdom has said, he was a real veteran of these meetings and a close friend of many of us at this table today. He did serve this Committee and his Government with distinction. His passing is a great personal loss to me, to my delegation and to my Government, and I know from what we have heard here this morning that it is a great loss to many at this table.

Ambassador Stelle was one of the foremost experts in my Government in the field of arms control and disarmament, and certainly in the field of nuclear tests. During his long service in Geneva he earnestly pursued every reasonable approach to agreement, in the belief that alternatives to the arms race were essential to peace. His knowledge, his competence and his dedication to our efforts will surely be missed by us all--and particularly, of course, by my delegation and my country.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Secretary of State Rusk said of Ambassador Stelle after his death:

"A dedicated career officer, Charles Stelle performed outstanding service for his country in varied and difficult assignments. During the last four years he served with great distinction at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, where, frequently acting as our chief delegate, he carried on a wide range of negotiations.

"To those of us in the Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency who were so closely associated with him, Charles Stelle's death is a tragic and great personal loss."

On behalf of my Government and of Mrs. Stelle, I wish to thank everyone in this Committee for the many expressions of sympathy and condolence which have been extended to me and the other members of our delegation. I can assure all of you that these kind expressions of sympathy will be conveyed to my Government and directly to Mrs. Stelle. As I said earlier, they will be a great comfort to her in her tragic loss.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I feel certain that it would be the desire of this Committee that the Secretariat should convey on its behalf to the family of Ambassador Stelle the text of the remarks made at today's meeting in tribute to his memory.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): The Committee will now turn to the business of today's meeting.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): Today we have general and complete disarmament on our agenda. But, in taking the floor for the first time during this session, I do not think it out of place to make a few general remarks on the present state of our negotiations after the brief recess.

At the beginning of this seventh session we have no new proposals before us; we are resuming our labours at the point where we left off. That does not mean, as indeed other delegations have pointed out, that the interval granted us for reflexion has been wasted. For our part, we have continued the detailed elaboration and preparation of our proposals, without, however, neglecting the study of other possible proposals.

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Naturally we have also continued our examination of the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union and all the other delegations. Hence we are now better prepared for the coming discussions, so that these may develop more constructively, concentrate on specific questions, and lead us ultimately to agreements.

The decision to curtail their production of fissionable materials for military purposes, taken on the eve of our recess by the United States (ENDC/132) and Soviet Union (ENDC/131) Governments, will continue to exert a favourable influence on our work. This decision shows us, so to speak, the path we should follow and the field in which we could easily reach our next agreements.

I should like to add that at the beginning of this session there are other positive factors: a serious and relaxed atmosphere in our discussions, an absence of noisy and tiresome propaganda, and categorical affirmations of a desire for collaboration. It should be noted that the representatives of the United States and of the Soviet Union expressed themselves at the meeting of 9 June in the same way and using almost the same words.

In his constructive and important speech, Mr. Foster said:

"The United States is ready to conclude firm agreements in each of the areas I have mentioned. It is also ready to consider any other reasonable proposal. My instructions are to pursue every practical means for halting the arms race and reducing armaments" (ENDC/PV.188, p.13).

Mr. Zorin said:

"The Soviet delegation begins the new stage of the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee with the firm intention of making the maximum useful contribution to these negotiations, being guided by the Soviet Government's firm instructions to do everything possible for the success of these negotiations." (ibid., p.19)

We had become accustomed to Mr. Zorin's intransigent and polemical tone. We were very pleased to find that tone absent from his speech last Tuesday. He said that disarmament was possible and that progress in this Committee was possible. We, the representatives of the Western Powers, had never doubted that possibility. We have always maintained the great value of this Committee's work. We voted for the United Nations

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resolutions on disarmament, and we are taking part in this Conference, because we were and are firmly convinced of the possibility and necessity of general and complete disarmament, and of the importance of this Committee's activities in achieving an international détente and peace.

We are pleased, at this stage of our discussions, to see that the Soviet delegation shares our views in this respect, whereas formerly it often seemed to underestimate this Committee's role and to despair of its achievement of any results. There has been a very appreciable evolution in the Soviet attitude. While it is true that we are still at the foot of the mountain, what matters is that all the climbers seem to be animated by the same determination and confidence that they will get to the top. The Italian delegation therefore takes note of the Soviet delegation's good intentions, and hopes that this time it will give us concrete proof of its conciliatory spirit.

We have already improved our working methods. There was a time when the Soviet delegation — as Mr. Zorin will remember — inflexibly upheld a policy of "all or nothing": either total disarmament at once, or nothing. The Soviet delegation has finally accepted the realistic method constantly proposed by the Western Powers: that of patiently and gradually seeking partial agreements which are immediate even if they are modest, and which will lead by degrees to total disarmament. The application of that method has led to the present improved prospects for an understanding, and to the appreciably better international atmosphere. We must of course patiently pursue the elaboration of our grand design: a treaty on general and complete disarmament, which is again on this Committee's agenda. That is a symbol of our intentions, and that is our principal marching order. This programme, which could indeed be called a mountain, must be attacked by all possible routes, and if one of them proves too hazardous, the others must be explored.

The Committee spent three months examining the Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) and the other related Soviet proposals: for the withdrawal of foreign troops and the liquidation of so-called "foreign" bases (ENDC/123). During the previous session (ENDC/PV.167, pp. 12 et seq.; /PV.171, pp. 13 et seq.) my delegation

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suggested a systematic and thorough study of the Gromyko plan side by side with our own proposals, the problems being divided into three categories: balance, control, and peace-keeping machinery. That was in fact the line taken by our discussions.

The examination was as complete as it could be considering the scanty information given by the Soviet delegation on the Gromyko proposal. We all know the result of that examination. We met obstacles which were objectively insurmountable. The Gromyko proposal, as it now stands, contravenes the principle of balance, does not provide for an adequate degree of control, and has nothing to say of the concomitant organization of world security. As the Italian delegation has shown by means of irrefutable technical data, the application of the Gromyko proposal could, in particular, compromise the security of Western Europe which would be cut off from its overseas allies and deprived of their immediate support, while an imposing military potential, both conventional and nuclear, would remain in Eastern Europe.

If I understood aright Mr. Zorin's speech at the meeting of 9 June (ENDC/PV.188, p.17), the Soviet delegation is now proposing the creation of a working group to study the Gromyko plan. Generally speaking, my delegation and the other Western delegations have always favoured the creation of groups to study the various problems in detail and thus render our work more constructive and more concrete. We are therefore only too happy to see that the Soviet delegation, hitherto hostile to the idea of study groups, now seems to have modified its attitude. That seems to be a promising development, and I hope that it will not be confined to a single question, but will be extended to our Conference's working methods as a whole.

In particular, I feel that the proposed study group should in any case deal with all the projects and plans which have been put forward concerning a reduction in nuclear delivery vehicles. Reference is often made to a "nuclear umbrella". I should like to remind you of what I said at our meeting of 7 April of the Indian delegation's views on this matter:

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"But I believe that, in the first place, if we are to understand each other fully, we must reach agreement on the meaning of the term nuclear umbrella. If this term means that, at a given stage of the disarmament process, only a fixed and strictly limited quantity of atomic weapons would remain on one side and the other, we could then say that there was agreement in principle on this point.

"On the other hand, it would be a different matter if we were asked to give our approval a priori to the particular 'nuclear umbrella' envisaged in Mr. Gromyko's proposal". (ENDC/PV.181, p.46).

With reference in particular to the Gromyko plan, Mr. Zorin's proposal appears to be interesting for two reasons. In the first place, the Gromyko plan has always been somewhat obscure, and our requests for more detailed explanations have never been answered in full. It may therefore be supposed that the Soviet delegation now wishes to give us the desired clarifications in a study group. In the second place, it is to be presumed that after three months' discussion our objections of substance to the Gromyko proposal are well known to the Soviet delegation. If the latter is now proposing that the examination of its project should be resumed, we have a right to hope that it is not opposed to the idea of favourably considering our objections.

In any case, it would be very strange if -- as a reading of the verbatim record of the meeting of 9 June appears to indicate -- approval in principle of a given proposal were to be required as a condition (ENDC/PV.188, p.17) of its further examination. That would indeed be putting the cart before the horse, for it is just the conclusions which might be reached by a study group after examining all the proposals which might provide a basis for deciding on the best method of creating a "nuclear umbrella".

I am unwilling to believe that the Soviet delegation is laying down an impossible pre-condition. I hope that the Soviet delegation's suggestion will be explained and developed further in the course of our forthcoming discussions, so that we can decide whether or not it opens up prospects for new and far-reaching constructive work on a progressive reduction in nuclear delivery vehicles,

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taking all possible proposals and suggestions into account. If, at present, such work should prove to be impossible or unconstructive, it should be understood that the Committee would always be ready to take up the Gromyko proposal again, together with other proposals, as soon as fresh elements appeared which would render further efforts fruitful and conclusive.

Our method should always be to postpone discussion of questions which have so far proved insoluble, and to undertake the discussion of other questions in the hope that their solution will facilitate that of the former. Mr. Thomas, the United Kingdom representative, stressing on 9 June the gap still existing between the positions of the two sides regarding a system for the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles, rightly said:

"The Committee may therefore agree that we should soon move on to the remaining items on our disarmament agenda. We might perhaps set ourselves the target of completing our examination of the items on this agenda before the next session of the United Nations General Assembly." (ibid., p.21)

The next questions on our Committee's agenda for general and complete disarmament are, as you all know, military bases and force levels. The first has already been discussed at great length within the framework of the Gromyko proposal, of which it forms an integral part. I do not believe that a fresh discussion of this subject would contribute any very new elements; but we do not refuse it if the Soviet delegation wishes it. The second question, force levels, is a very vast and complex one; it involves, of course, numerous technical factors. It has never been thoroughly examined by this Committee, and could provide fruitful soil for a full technical and political discussion, particularly as the divergences do not appear at first sight to be very great.

Before concluding, I should like to make one final remark. Since the Soviet delegation appears to have abandoned its reservations of principle to the creation of study groups, improved working prospects are open to us in several fields, in regard both to general and complete disarmament and to collateral measures. I am sure that all delegations present will be glad, so far as lies within their power, to give these working groups the assistance

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of their experts. Regarding the composition of these groups, we shall of course not lay down any pre-conditions. We do not ask that our proposals should be accepted in principle, any more than we should accept such a request from other delegations. The subject will be open to free discussion. All proposals will have to be examined, and the result of the studies will provide us with the requisite technical elements for the mutual adjustment of the different views and for the most appropriate compromise decisions. I am sure that the initial results of these study groups will encourage us to continue and develop this working method to an increasing extent, and that the Conference will finally achieve the substantial and constructive impetus awaited impatiently by world public opinion.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): As has already been stated, it is by decision of the Committee, following upon a recommendation made to us by our co-Chairmen, that we have decided at this session, as at our last session, to devote our Tuesday meetings to the subject of general and complete disarmament. At our meeting of 9 June the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Mr. Thomas (ENDC/PV.188, p.20), and the leader of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Zorin (ibid., pp.16, 17), referred briefly to the problem of reducing and eliminating nuclear delivery vehicles within the framework of a disarmament treaty. Today I should like to make some observations in the light of their remarks.

First, let me remind the Committee that, like many other delegations, the United Kingdom delegation regards this problem as one of the main problems lying at the heart of the whole question of disarmament. On previous occasions I have indicated that we attach great importance to its early solution, and of course we still do.

In the second place, I should like to remind the Committee at the outset of this new session that we are all agreed on our basic objective. The 1961 Joint Statement of Agreed Principles laid down:

"3. ... the programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:

... (c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction:" (ENDC/5/, p.2)

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

That is the aim on which we are all agreed. That is the broad agreement in principle which we have already adopted and to which we all continue to subscribe. I think it is useful to remind ourselves periodically of that fact.

In the third place, I suggest that there is already a wide measure of agreement on how we should attain our common objective. In spite of certain differences of interpretation which are well known to the Committee, paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Joint Statement provide us with helpful guidelines in this respect, particularly on questions such as balance during the disarmament process, security of States, verification and confidence between States, and international peace-keeping arrangements.

But that is not all. I have in the past suggested that there are other areas where a good deal of common ground exists between us, and I should like briefly to enumerate some of those areas again today.

We are agreed that mankind now possesses armaments which, as Mr. Zorin said on 9 June, "could reduce to ashes every living thing in any part of the world" (ENDC/PV.188, p.15).

We are agreed that, as a result of these armaments, a rough balance of deterrence now exists between both sides.

We are agreed that, to quote from Mr. Krushchev's statement of 20 April last:

"... the solidity of the nuclear missile shield ... reliably safeguards

the security of all the countries of the socialist community." (ENDC/131, p.2)

I might add to that quotation that the security of all the countries of the Western community is also reliably safeguarded by our own nuclear missile shield.

We are agreed that it is in the interests of us all to see that a stable balance of nuclear power between both sides, and of nuclear missile shields on both sides, should be maintained before and during the disarmament process and thus help to preserve peace between the nuclear Powers.

We are agreed that during the three disarmament stages such a balance should be reduced to lower and less costly levels than at present, as quickly as can safely and practicably be achieved.

We are agreed that, as envisaged in both the United States and the Soviet disarmament plans, the nuclear missile shields on both sides should be reduced from 100 per cent at the beginning of stage I to zero at the end of stage III.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

We are agreed that, by the end of the disarmament process, international peace and security should be maintained by international peace-keeping machinery which, to quote from paragraph 7 of the Joint Statement --

" ... can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations."

(ENDC/5, p.3)

We are agreed that there is an intimate link between the abolition of national nuclear deterrents and the introduction of these international peace-keeping arrangements. In other words, no nuclear Power can be expected entirely to dismantle its present security arrangements until it can rely on other equally effective sources of security.

We are agreed that, at least somewhere towards the end of the disarmament process, both sides should have reduced the number of their nuclear delivery vehicles to a level below which they cannot be expected to fall until both sides are satisfied that their security can be guaranteed by an effective international peace-keeping force under satisfactory political control.

Finally, with that last point in mind, we are agreed--- and this is also envisaged in both plans--- that, as disarmament proceeds, both sides should retain a smaller, agreed and verified number of nuclear delivery vehicles in order to deter aggression throughout the process of reduction.

Here, then, are various areas in which, I submit, there is a broad measure of agreement. I suggest that they are more than enough to justify us in now turning to the discussion of their detailed application. The Committee should now be getting down to what is now needed--- namely, businesslike or workmanlike discussions in detail and in depth of the various measures proposed in the two plans before us-- in order to resolve existing differences which, by and large, are primarily differences over how to attain our agreed objective.

The measures proposed by the West are familiar to the Committee; therefore I shall not repeat them today. After careful reflection we still consider that they represent a sound, sensible and practical way to proceed.

As regards the measures proposed by the Soviet Government in its draft treaty (ENDC/2/Rev.1), these -- as Mr. Thomas pointed out last week (ENDC/PV.188, p.21) -- have also been discussed at some length during previous sessions, and particularly during the last session. The differences between the measures proposed by both sides are well known to the Committee. I need not, therefore,

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

summarize them today or rehearse the difficulties which we in the West still see in the measures in the revised Soviet plan insofar as these have been elaborated for us.

I noted with interest that in his statement at our meeting on 9 June the representative of the Soviet Union informed us that his delegation had also carried out an analysis of the debates and negotiations that took place earlier this year, and had reported its conclusions to its Government (ibid, p.16). I also noted Mr. Zorin's remark that ---presumably as a result of that analysis and report the Soviet Union was "taking yet another step forward to meet the Western Powers" (ibid, p.17).

I have also studied with interest the passage in our Soviet colleague's statement which immediately followed that remark. In that passage he offered to consider in detail specific questions relating to the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in an appropriate working body, if the Committee approved the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) as a basis for the solution of the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. In our view, a working group to deal with this problem might materially accelerate the work of this Conference; it could indeed constitute a significant step forward and one which we should naturally welcome. The Committee is well aware of the value which we in the United Kingdom delegation see in such methods of work.

But a proposal for a working group restricted to discussion of the ideas of only one side would not, in our view, advance us beyond our present position; and the Committee will recall the very real difficulties which we in the West at present see in the ideas so far put forward from the Soviet side. In other words, while I believe it to be true that we can all accept the principle that disarmament should take place under some form of "nuclear umbrella" --- or, as we prefer to call it, a system of mutual nuclear deterrence involving the retention of nuclear delivery vehicles by both sides until the end of stage III --- we are not yet agreed as to how this principle should be applied in practice. In particular, as I have indicated, what we have so far been told about the Soviet version of this "umbrella" causes us serious difficulty.

Therefore I repeat the hope of the United Kingdom delegation that it may be possible to agree on the establishment of a working group free to discuss ideas on this subject from whatever quarter they may be advanced. I very much hope that the remarks of the Soviet representative show that he too contemplates a procedure of that kind.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Before stating our position on the question of general and complete disarmament which is on the agenda of today's meeting, I should like to make two preliminary comments.

First of all, I should like to draw the attention of members of the Committee to the letter of the Government of the German Democratic Republic dated 11 June 1964, which has been issued at the request of the Soviet delegation as an official document of our Conference (ENDC/133). That letter concerns the latest proposals of the German Democratic Republic on the question of the renunciation of nuclear weapons by the two German States. In view of the reluctance of the Federal Republic of Germany to agree to the conclusion between the two German States of a treaty on the complete renunciation of nuclear weapons, the German Democratic Republic proposed on 26 May that an agreement to renounce nuclear weapons be given an official character in the form of unilateral declarations by the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

It is perfectly clear that the proposal of the German Democratic Republic is of great significance from the point of view of safeguarding security in Europe and thus throughout the world, and that it is, consequently, of no little interest to the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The rejection of this proposal by the Federal Republic of Germany -- a proposal which has confirmed once again the consistent, peace-loving character of the foreign policy of the German Democratic Republic -- has shown at the same time the obvious striving of the ruling circles of Western Germany to obtain access to nuclear weapons at any cost and to place them at the service of their revenge-seeking plans. I trust that the members of the Committee will acquaint themselves with this important document and will take into consideration the views set forth in it when discussing questions of nuclear disarmament.

My second preliminary comment relates to certain statements that have been made before the statement of our delegation. I refer above all to the statement made by the representative of Italy, my old friend Mr. Cavalletti. In his statement Mr. Cavalletti referred (supra, p.14) to a certain evolution which he said had taken place in the position of the Soviet delegation; and he drew our attention to a number of points which testified to such an evolution.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

In the first place, he pointed out that the delegations of the Western Powers had — perhaps this is not quite accurate, but it is what I heard in the interpretation — "always spoken in favour of general and complete disarmament". I venture to disagree with that. This opinion of mine is not based on any abstract ideas but on the concrete facts of our work in the preceding period, from the United Nations General Assembly to the work of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament and, later, the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

I have had, I may say, the opportunity of participating in the work of these forums, and I remember that the Western delegations have by no means always spoken in favour of general and complete disarmament. It would be sufficient to look through the verbatim records of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which also held its meetings in Geneva, in order to be convinced of the truth of what I say. I think that the Secretariat of our Conference can at any time put before Mr. Cavalletti and other members of the Committee the relevant information. In the Ten-Nation Committee many of the delegations, including the Italian delegation, did not always speak in favour of general and complete disarmament. I would not wish at present to burden all the members of the Committee with specific references to the statements made by various delegates, but I think that all the participants in our former negotiations are able to confirm that that is in fact the case. But let us not reproach our partners with every error.

The Western delegations, in fact, committed this sin: that they not only did not believe in general and complete disarmament, but even deemed it useless to discuss the matter. Consequently, if one is to speak of an evolution having taken place, I think that an evolution in regard to this important matter has taken place in the position of the Western Powers. When Mr. Cavalletti dealt with the question of the position of the Soviet delegation and tried to ascribe to it an evolution in its position towards certain disarmament questions, he said — and I made a note of this also from the interpretation — that there was a time when the Soviet delegation put forward the demand "all or nothing" — that is, either general and complete disarmament or no negotiations at all.

I venture to disagree also with that thesis put forward by Mr. Cavalletti. And if his memory has failed him, I will take the liberty of reminding him of a document which Mr. Cavalletti and any member of the Committee can easily obtain

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

from the Secretariat. It is an official document of the United Nations General Assembly (A/4219, dated 19 September 1959). That document is the Declaration of the Soviet Government on general and complete disarmament, which was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, and which was the basis of the resolution on general and complete disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its fourteenth session (A/RES/1378(XIV)). The document contains an outline of the programme for general and complete disarmament proposed by the Soviet Government, which, as we know, was subsequently incorporated in the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1) which is now one of the most important bases of the work of our Committee. In that document it was stated:

"It goes without saying that the Soviet Government wishes to approach the existing situation realistically, and if at present the Western Powers do not, for one reason or another, express their readiness to embark upon general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Government is prepared, as before, to come to terms with other States on appropriate partial measures relating to disarmament and the strengthening of security. In the view of the Soviet Government, the most important steps are the following:

"(1) The establishment of a control and inspection zone, and the reduction of foreign troops in the territories of the Western European countries concerned;

"(2) The establishment of an 'atom-free' zone in Central Europe;

"(3) The withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of European States and abolition of military bases in the territories of foreign States;

"(4) The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States members of NATO and the States members of the Warsaw Treaty;

"(5) The conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of surprise attack by one State upon another". (A/4219, para.77)

Further on in the document it was stated:

"With respect to the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, the Soviet Government has been and still is in favour of immediate cessation of such tests for all time." (ibid, para.79)

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Does that document confirm the position of the Italian delegation to the effect that we proposed "all or nothing"? No; that document does not confirm your thesis, Mr. Cavalletti. On the contrary, it refutes your thesis. Ever since the question of general and complete disarmament was first raised, as far back as 19 September 1959, we have said that we are in favour of general and complete disarmament as the principal way and the most important means to solve the problem of maintaining and consolidating peace. At the same time, however, we say that we are prepared to come to terms with other States on appropriate partial measures relating to disarmament and the strengthening of security.

Why then, Mr. Cavalletti, do you describe our position in a way that does not correspond to the actual state of affairs or to the documents submitted -- which, by the way, can easily be obtained? Consequently, when Mr. Cavalletti said today that we have now taken a realistic path and are prepared to consider so-called collateral measures, whereas previously we were taking an unrealistic path, such a statement does not correspond to the truth. We were taking a realistic path before and we are still taking it. The only difference is that, in the past, the Western Powers did not consider it possible to base general and complete disarmament on the whole work of the Committee. It is in your position, not in ours, that an evolution has now taken place. You consider it possible to base the question of preparing a treaty on general and complete disarmament on the Committee's work. That evolution is a good one. I consider that in this regard you are making progress. But to ascribe to us an evolution which does not exist is, in my opinion, incorrect.

Those were the few remarks which I wished to make for the time being on Mr. Cavalletti's statement. However, Mr. Cavalletti said that all mountain-climbers wish to reach the top of the mountain. I agree. In fact, practically all the members of our Committee now appear to want to reach the top of the mountain -- that is to say, the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Let us set out by this right path together with all the mountain-climbers, including Mr. Cavalletti!

I should now like to set forth a number of considerations of the Soviet delegation which are directly connected with the question of general and complete disarmament and with the stage in its discussion which now appears to have been reached.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Today the Committee is resuming its consideration of the question of preparing a treaty on general and complete disarmament, which is the main task set before us by the United Nations General Assembly and all the peoples of the world. For the success of our work it would be useful to try to evaluate objectively and realistically the situation which has come about at the present time in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament and to see, as the saying goes, where we stand. It is necessary to do this in order to see things in their right perspective and thus make it easier to find such a way for further negotiations as would offer most chances of success.

If one considers the way in which the negotiations on disarmament have developed since, in 1959, the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, put forward at the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly his historic proposal on general and complete disarmament, one is bound to recognize that the situation in the negotiations has undergone, during these years, definite and considerable changes. Whereas a few years ago the negotiations on general and complete disarmament were essentially a form of monologue, since only the socialist and some non-aligned countries spoke in favour of a positive solution of this problem, while the Western Powers declared general and complete disarmament to be practically "general and complete chaos"; whereas in those days the participants in the negotiations had practically no points of contact; in more recent years, as a result of the persistent efforts of the peace-loving Powers, it has been possible to bring about a different situation. This, incidentally, was also mentioned this morning by the representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Paul Mason, who stressed a whole number of areas of agreement which have emerged during the discussion of problems of general and complete disarmament.

There is a different international climate, which has become more favourable to purposeful negotiations on general and complete disarmament. Tension has decreased; the young growths of confidence in relations between States have made their appearance and are beginning to take root. A certain basis for negotiations on general and complete disarmament, accepted and recognized by all the participants, has also been established.

Now no one speaks against the principle of general and complete disarmament. Everyone recognizes the need to work out an agreed programme of such disarmament and to prepare an appropriate draft international treaty. It has been possible

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to reach agreement also on a number of general principles that are to underlie such a treaty. An understanding has also been achieved between the sides that the process of general and complete disarmament must be definitely limited in time; and although one side pronounces itself in favour of a period of implementation of the disarmament process almost twice as long as the period proposed by the other side, it may be assumed that here again there are possibilities of bringing the positions closer together. Everyone agrees, also, that general and complete disarmament must be carried out in stages, and that it would be most appropriate to lay down three such stages and to fix definite time-limits for each of them.

One may say that in the area of general and complete disarmament a sort of contour map has emerged, on which the shapes of continents, oceans and seas have been sketched in with dotted lines. This, of course, has a certain significance. It is well known, however, that a contour map cannot serve as a guide for those who want to set out on a journey. It needs to be filled in and completed with the conventional signs used for mountain ranges, lakes, rivers, towns and other inhabited centres, and communication routes. It is precisely the task of the participants in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament to supplement the abstract formulas of general principles with an agreement on the concrete measures of disarmament at each stage, on the appropriate measures for control and for the strengthening of international security.

What has been done in this respect? Has any progress been made? As regards the order of elimination of the armed forces and conventional armaments of States, a positive answer can be given to that question. Yes: the positions of the sides in regard to the manner of carrying out the disbandment of the armed forces of States and the elimination of tanks, cannon, machine-guns and sub-machine guns are now not so very far apart. I think that the participants in the negotiations will agree with me if I say that this rapprochement is the result, above all, of the perseverance of the socialist States members of the Committee, of their constructive efforts and flexibility. The efforts of the non-aligned States members of the Committee have also proved useful.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

If the success of our negotiations could be measured by the standards of the nineteen-twenties or thirties, one might even rejoice at such results. After all, the disarmament conferences which took place in those days never succeeded in achieving mutual understanding, even in the most general form, on the necessity of completely eliminating the armed forces and armaments of States, let alone on the approximate order of implementation of that task. It suffices to recall how the Soviet Government's proposals on general disarmament were received in the Commissions of the League of Nations and, later, at the International Conference on Disarmament.

But we are conducting negotiations in an altogether different age, in which the spread of scientific and technical progress to the military sphere has led to a veritable revolution in the field of military technique and strategy. In our nuclear age it is impossible to use the standards of pre-nuclear concepts. In our days, to achieve a rapprochement of the positions in regard to the order of elimination of tanks and cannon is, in fact, of just as little significance as it would have been to achieve agreement on the order of elimination of swords and other side-arms thirty years ago. Under the new conditions, when States possess nuclear weapons -- weapons of mass destruction -- and improved means for delivering them to any target, the first place in the field of disarmament belongs by the force of things to new problems -- those of nuclear disarmament.

Thus, if one approaches the matter from these positions, it must be recognized that no progress has been achieved in the negotiations since the Committee began to deal with problems of nuclear disarmament. We have had no success in the main task. This gives rise to regret and anxiety, but it is a fact.

Let us try to determine what hinders any movement forward in agreeing on the nuclear aspects of the programme of general and complete disarmament; what is the stumbling-block? If we consider matters as a whole, we can discern three main areas of disagreement on problems of nuclear disarmament. One of them is the order of elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles; another is the destruction of nuclear weapons; and a third is the elimination of foreign military bases located in the territories of other countries as strong-points intended mainly for stationing nuclear weapons closer to the borders of the other side.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Why is there no real rapprochement of the positions on questions of nuclear disarmament? What is the reason for this? A careful analysis of the whole course of the negotiations on these questions leads to the conclusion that whereas, on questions relating to the elimination of non-nuclear means of warfare, the sides generally adhere in one way or another to the principle of an approach ensuring equality, equal conditions of security for all States in the disarmament process, when it comes to the elimination of nuclear arms the situation is altogether different.

Let us take the question of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. The proposals of the two sides on this question are well known. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries declare themselves in favour of eliminating all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles at the first stage, whereas the United States of America and the other Western Powers are in favour of a gradual, stage-by-stage reduction of delivery vehicles by roughly one-third at each stage. What is the military and political purport of our Soviet proposals? It is, above all, to free the peoples of the world from the oppressive menace of a thermonuclear war at the very first stage, that is at the very beginning of the disarmament process. Furthermore, no State, when the levels of armed forces are changed during the disarmament process, would be able to use the means of nuclear attack to carry out acts of aggression against other States. Lastly, the Soviet proposals are so designed as practically to preclude, from the very first stage, such a development of events as would make it possible for any State to calculate that by halting the disarmament process it would find itself in a strategically more advantageous position in relation to other States.

In going forward to meet the wishes of the Western Powers for additional safeguards of security during the disarmament process, the Soviet Union, as you know, declared its readiness to make an exception to its proposed order of elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. It suggested that the Soviet Union and the United States retain until the end of the disarmament process a limited and agreed number of intercontinental, anti-missile and anti-aircraft missiles together with the nuclear warheads pertaining to them. It is obvious that this "nuclear umbrella" proposal not only safeguards the security of States during the disarmament process, but also gives the two sides an equal guarantee of security.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

What, then, is the United States approach to the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles? Here in the Committee the representatives of a number of States have already shown on many occasions that the proposal put forward by the United States for the gradual, stage-by-stage destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is, in reality, far from being an approach that ensures equality. One can only add that the most recent statements by representatives of the United States Government about the "manifold superiority" of the United States over the Soviet Union in regard to the number of intercontinental missiles and bombers in its possession throw, it seems to us, some additional light on the aims and motives of the authors and advocates of the proposal for a gradual, stage-by-stage reduction of delivery vehicles.

Of course, we are not going to try to calculate the missiles and bombers at your disposal, Mr. Foster, and at our disposal, nor will we cite our own figures in this regard. I should like to say, however, that it makes us wonder where the other side actually gets its figures on the number of intercontinental missiles and bombers at the disposal of the Soviet Union. Those figures are given on the entire responsibility of those who deal with them. We are bound, however, to draw attention to the following. Although the United States Government bases itself, apparently, on those figures, it nevertheless recognizes -- and it cannot do otherwise -- that the Soviet Union possesses sufficient intercontinental nuclear weapon delivery vehicles to deal a crushing retaliatory nuclear blow.

On 12 June the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, said at a meeting in connexion with Soviet-German friendship that according to information emanating from United States strategists the United States had accumulated "so many nuclear weapons that it could kill every Russian three times over. By the word 'Russian' they mean 'all the people in the Soviet Union'. In speaking in that way", Mr. Khrushchev added, "they do not, however, lose their reason. They admit that the Russians also have as many nuclear bombs as to be able to kill them, but only once." And Mr. Khrushchev remarked, not without irony: "Strictly speaking, that's enough".

That being so, one cannot help wondering whether some people in the United States, trusting in their "manifold superiority" in regard to the number of

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intercontinental missiles and bombers, are counting upon changing the situation during the disarmament process in such a way that at some particular moment the United States would still retain the capacity to deal a powerful nuclear blow while the other side would have already been deprived of that capacity. We do not know, of course, whether the United States strategists in the field of disarmament really embody this way of thinking in their proposal for a gradual, percentage reduction of delivery vehicles, but one gets the impression that such calculations evidently do exist.

If that is so, irrespective of the actual correlation of forces in regard to intercontinental delivery vehicles which exists at the present time between the Soviet Union and the United States -- and concerning which, I repeat, we do not intend to cite any of our figures -- then, in virtue of the foregoing considerations, the logic of the United States proposal concerning the order of elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles cannot inspire trust. I think that is clear and that there is no need for further explanations.

Does not the same picture emerge also in connexion with the question of eliminating nuclear weapons themselves? It is well known that the Soviet Union proposes the elimination of nuclear weapons, such as missile warheads (excepting, of course, those to be retained for the "nuclear umbrella"), air-borne nuclear bombs, atomic artillery shells, in the second stage of general and complete disarmament. Moreover, we are prepared to agree to the implementation of this measure in the first stage, if this is acceptable to our partners. There is only one thing that we are not prepared to do, and that is to renounce the complete elimination of nuclear weapons during the process of general and complete disarmament and to agree to the retention of such weapons by States. Is there any need to prove that our proposal is based on the principle of an approach ensuring equality for the security interests of both sides? It appears to be quite obvious.

The United States proposal on the question of nuclear weapons is based, it seems, on something else. It does not at all provide for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The wording in the United States outline of a draft treaty (ENDC/30) in regard to this question is deliberately vague. It appears to be

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designed to permit the nuclear Powers to retain a number of nuclear weapons even after the completion of the disarmament process. Indeed, in regard to the size of accumulated nuclear stockpiles the United States representatives are fond of repeating that the United States stockpiles are many times larger than those of the Soviet Union. Just as where the question of delivery vehicles is concerned, one cannot help paying attention to the logic which the other side has embodied in its proposal.

As regards the third area of disagreement -- the question of the order of elimination of foreign military bases in the territories of other countries -- the picture is even clearer. We propose to eliminate all these bases in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, to get rid of them once and for all, and to remove from the face of the earth these breeding-grounds of tension. But under the United States plan the elimination of military bases is postponed to the end of disarmament and is not fully completed even in the third stage. Does there not peep through in this case also the same desire to retain for oneself certain military advantages to the detriment of the security interests of the other side?

Such is the state of affairs; and we deem it necessary to speak about it with complete frankness, since to minimize the existing differences and to embellish the picture would be tantamount, at least, to showing a lack of responsibility. Our work here is too serious and important to the peoples of the world to allow us to sow any illusions. Yes, our differences on questions of nuclear disarmament are profound. We have different approaches to the solution of these questions. This is to be regretted; but we cannot close our eyes to this fact.

But those who are striving to achieve agreement on general and complete disarmament as quickly as possible and, like mountain-climbers, to reach the top of the mountain, would be failing in their duty if they confined themselves to expressing regret at existing differences. Our task is not to be discouraged by failures but to seek out ways that would lead to success. The Soviet Government considers that there are possibilities for lessening and subsequently eliminating the differences, for bringing the positions closer together and finding mutually-acceptable solutions. In order to move forward, thoughtful and purposeful work is needed. We are prepared for such work.

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In accordance with the instructions of the Soviet Government, we consider it expedient -- as was agreed between the co-Chairmen -- to concentrate our efforts in the immediate future on the key issue of the general and complete disarmament programme -- the question of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. We think all the delegations will agree with us that, if we succeed in reaching agreement on the order of elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, it will be easier to deal with the remaining questions, the remaining measures of nuclear disarmament.

As regards nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, is there at present a basis for setting about a concrete consideration of appropriate practical matters, including details? The Soviet Union has done everything in its power to establish such a basis. Our "nuclear umbrella" proposal takes into account the interests of all sides; it is based on the principle of real equality of security conditions; it does not give anybody unilateral advantages, nor does it place anybody in a vulnerable position.

You know what wide support is given to this proposal by world opinion, including eminent scientists of our time, who have a particularly lucid and profound awareness of the realities of the nuclear age and the need to resolve nuclear disarmament questions with due regard to the security interests of all parties. We are pleased that many delegations here in the Committee have expressed their approval of our "nuclear umbrella" proposal. I should like to point out that, as far as we know, the "nuclear umbrella" idea or, as some call it, the "minimum deterrent", is not alien to the political thinking of a number of other States represented in the Committee. As could be seen from today's statement by the United Kingdom representative, this apparently applies to the United Kingdom delegation as well.

In these circumstances, the appeal of the Indian delegation (ENDC/PV.177, pp.28 et seq.) to go on to a detailed examination -- after approving in principle the "nuclear umbrella" proposal -- of practical questions related to its implementation seems to us altogether natural and constructive. It is precisely for this reason that our side has expressed its readiness to begin, on the basis of this Indian suggestion, the examination of the aforesaid questions in an appropriate working group enlisting, if necessary, the services of experts. If the Western Powers agree to this, a new and very promising stage can begin in the

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work of the Committee; the stage of working out, on the basis of an agreement in principle, military and scientific technical parameters for the solution of one of the cardinal questions of the general and complete disarmament programme. At the same time, the very achievement of an agreement in principle to retain until the end of the third stage of disarmament the "nuclear umbrella" as a reliable safeguard of security, while eliminating in the first stage all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, would be a symbol, nay, evidence of the general readiness of the participants in the negotiations to approach not only non-nuclear but also nuclear disarmament from the position of ensuring equal security for all parties.

Of course, it cannot be excluded that, after agreeing on the "nuclear umbrella" in principle, we may have differences in a working group in regard to some particular details. There is no doubt, however, that, given an agreement in principle, it will be easier to come to an understanding on details and that, on the other hand, without such an agreement in principle any study of details in a working group, any attempts to reconcile the respective points of view, will be illusory, pointless and doomed to failure from the outset. Let us be realists and set about this business on a realistic basis.

At the end of the preceding session of the Committee, the Nigerian representative expressed the idea that the participants in the negotiations should go in for some original dialogue on the concrete problems of the general and complete disarmament programme (ENDC/PV.187, p.27 et seq.). At the meeting on 11 June the representative of Ethiopia also urged the Committee "to find ways and means of arriving at general and complete disarmament". (ENDC/PV.189, p.9). The Soviet delegation declares itself ready to find such ways and means and to begin such straight talk. We expect the same readiness from the other side. We expect that the representatives of the non-aligned States members of the Committee will also take steps aimed at the speediest and most practical solution of the aforementioned problems. Upon all this will depend whether we succeed in getting the negotiations on general and complete disarmament moving, and whether we are able to make the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee productive.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): This is the first occasion on which the Canadian delegation has spoken during this session, and I wish to join with others who have extended their condolences to the delegation of India, and through it to the Indian people, on the death of Prime Minister Nehru. As members of the Commonwealth to which Prime Minister Nehru contributed so much, Canadians have felt his loss very deeply. All of us here know how much this great world statesman did for the cause of peace. To all peoples living under the threat of nuclear war he spoke with the voice of sanity and worked untiringly to help lay the foundations of a truly peaceful world. We in this Committee can draw inspiration from Prime Minister Nehru's words and work as we go forward in our attempt to halt or diminish the arms race. At this time we remember with gratitude the outstanding role Prime Minister Nehru personally played in focusing, at a very early stage, world attention on the necessity for the cessation of nuclear weapon testing.

It has been pointed out very appropriately that there could be no more fitting monument to the memory of this great leader of our times than early progress towards a world without war. In this, our Committee has a vital part to play.

On behalf of the Canadian delegation, I wish, as others have done, to extend a warm welcome to Mr. Correa do Lago, the representative of Brazil, and to Mr. Gomez Robledo, the representative of Mexico, who are taking part in the work of this Committee for the first time. It is also very pleasant to welcome back to this table representatives who have participated in the Committee's work in the past but whose presence we missed more recently. We are most gratified that we have Mr. Foster and Mr. Zorin as our co-Chairmen, and we look forward to a productive session under their guidance.

The Canadian delegation was encouraged by the opening statements which were delivered last week. They showed a common desire that during the coming months the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should make real progress which we shall be able to report to the nineteenth session of the General Assembly. My delegation does not underestimate the difficulties which confront us. However, the experience of the last year, and especially the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty, has proved that difficulties can be surmounted and that patient effort and goodwill yield results. The Canadian delegation fully agreed with the representative of the Soviet Union when, speaking last week of the ultimate success of our negotiations, he said:

"It pertains not to the realm of fantasy but to the realm of the possible. Let us make it a reality" (ENDC/PV.188, p.19)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Turning now to some of the specific subjects which representatives have suggested the Committee should take up in the immediate future, the Canadian delegation was glad to hear from the representative of the United States that he will elaborate further the proposals (ENDC/120) which President Johnson presented to the Conference at the beginning of the last session. Mr. Foster, in his opening address, laid considerable emphasis on two aspects of our negotiations, both of which are relevant to general and complete disarmament as well as to the field of collateral measures. These were the cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapons uses, and the general subject of verification as it applies both to measures of general disarmament and to collateral measures. I certainly believe that the cessation of production of fissionable materials is a subject to which this Committee could usefully devote further study. The simultaneous announcements at the end of the last session by the three nuclear Powers represented here that they would cut back their output of these materials indicate that further negotiation could lead to greater progress in this field. As to verification, this is of course an issue which continues to be a major source of difficulty in our negotiations. We would hope that, after the verification required for certain specific measures has been explained and explored, there will be a drawing together of the positions of the two sides on this vital matter.

The Canadian delegation noted that almost all representatives emphasized in their opening statements that the Committee's working methods and procedures should be improved. This was a point which figured very prominently in the statements we heard from the non-aligned members of our Conference, and it was mentioned also by representatives of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries. Of course, the need to increase the efficiency of our working methods has been recognized in the past. But perhaps now, after over two years of work, we are in a position to assess more realistically than before just what is needed, and to do something about it.

There seem to me to be two objectives which changes in our working methods should be designed to attain. One is greater informality in our discussion and less reliance on the exchange of set speeches. Any procedure which will encourage a livelier and less rigid examination of the material before us will improve the chances for real and constructive negotiation. Our second objective should be to establish machinery which will permit a more detailed, practical and concrete examination of the specific elements of the problems which we are seeking to solve. These two objectives, I believe, are to a large extent interdependent: greater informality in our debates would undoubtedly accompany any success in devising methods which would allow us to concentrate on the practical details of individual problems, and vice versa.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

In this connexion, we were encouraged to hear the representative of the Soviet Union say, in his first statement, that his delegation was prepared --

"...to participate in the most active manner in businesslike, concrete work also in regard to agreeing on individual measures aimed at easing international tension and slowing the arms race". (ENDC/PV.188, p.17)

We hope very much that this statement by Mr. Zorin means that the Soviet delegation will during our present session co-operate fully in responding to the desire which has been expressed so often in this Committee for discussions in specific terms and not in broad generalities. The representative of Brazil described why a change in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee's approach was needed when he pointed out a week ago that --

"... in many cases the lack of a political decision is merely a consequence of lack of adequate technical knowledge...". (ibid., p.8)

I agree with our Brazilian colleague's statement completely and with his subsequent remark that --

"... our work could be considerably expedited and led to practical results if we could conduct political negotiations and technical discussions simultaneously". (ibid.)

The Canadian delegation is hopeful that during the current round of negotiation we shall be able to combine technical study with political consideration of the problems before us. It is in this light that I wish to consider the specific suggestion which Mr. Zorin made on 9 June (ibid., p.17) and which he has elaborated further today.

Before referring to Mr. Zorin's specific suggestion, I would say that I was interested to hear him state today that the Western Powers had shown an evolution in their approach. I did not quite understand why he should have resisted the suggestion that the ideas of the Soviet Union and its allies in regard to the negotiations on general and complete disarmament had evolved; he apparently did not find that suggestion altogether pleasant. I should have thought that evolution in the ideas of both sides would be necessary if this Committee were eventually to reach agreement -- and I hope that this will take place.

The statement which Mr. Zorin made today requires, of course, very careful study. The Canadian delegation certainly intends to study the statement carefully. We are sure that other members of the Committee will be replying to some of the views expressed by the representative of the Soviet Union today. Provisionally, I must say

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

that I was rather disappointed at hearing what is intended in regard to the "appropriate working body" to which Mr. Zorin referred on 9 June. In this respect, I did not find that there had been the hoped-for evolution in the attitude of the Soviet delegation towards the problem of reaching agreement on how nuclear weapon vehicles should be eliminated throughout the process of disarmament. However, as I said, we intend to study this more carefully.

The Canadian delegation does believe very strongly that the prospects for working out an early agreed solution to this central problem of how nuclear weapon vehicles are to be reduced, and finally eliminated, in the course of a programme of general disarmament, depend on our finding a method whereby the complexities of this measure can be examined in a concrete way. During our last session, there was a full discussion of the general philosophy underlying the proposals which the major Powers have put forward in this field. If we did not make more progress then in bridging the gap between the two positions, it was because our discussion remained in the realm of generalities and did not get down to facts and figures.

Of course, the goal of a detailed examination of this sort is to negotiate solutions acceptable to all parties to an eventual agreement. A discussion which was restricted to the proposals of only one party would be unable to arrive at this goal. As regards nuclear weapon vehicles, it seems to my delegation that both sides have shown their concern that these most powerful armaments in the arsenals of nations should be reduced and eliminated as quickly as they can be. The representative of the United Kingdom referred to this, among other points of agreement, in his statement this morning. But this reduction must be made on the condition that the security of all is preserved in the course of disarmament. The representative of the Soviet Union also referred to this principle. So these common purposes seem to my delegation to provide adequate bases for productive work in an appropriate group.

The Canadian delegation believes that the first step is for our co-Chairmen together to find a formula, or outline of the terms of reference for such a group, which they can recommend for adoption by the Conference. It would be a source of great encouragement to the world if the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament could report to the next session of the General Assembly that the most difficult and crucial of all measures in the field of general disarmament -- and that is the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles -- was finally being tackled with the seriousness of purpose which it demands.

Regarding the further programme for our discussion of general and complete disarmament, the Canadian delegation is in broad agreement with the suggestions made in this respect by the representative of the United Kingdom at the meeting on 9 June. Certainly it would be desirable for the Committee to cover as much ground as possible before the next session of the General Assembly. At the same time, I think we should adopt a flexible approach in deciding which of the remaining items in document ENDC/52 the Committee should discuss during the coming months.

The Canadian delegation sees no special advantage in following the precise order in which these items are listed in that document. It may be that the co-Chairmen, when discussing this matter, can agree that some particular first-stage measures offer more promising prospects for constructive discussion than some others. Should this occur, the Canadian delegation believes that they should recommend that the Committee give these items priority in our discussions, irrespective of the place which the items occupy in document ENDC/52.

Since the Canadian delegation did not participate in our general debate last week, and since I have been commenting on the question of procedure, I hope you will allow me to make a brief remark on our working methods as these apply to the discussion of collateral measures.

The Canadian delegation agrees with those who urged last week that during this session a renewed effort be made to establish an agenda for our work in this field. There are several solutions which could be found to permit the Committee to concentrate our discussion more effectively on collateral measures. We understand that this matter has been discussed already by the co-Chairmen, and we look forward to an early report from them on their attempt to agree on a procedure which will allow the Committee to examine selected collateral measures in an orderly way.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): In accordance with the good traditions of this Committee, I should like, in beginning my first statement at this session, to greet both the new and the previous participants in our negotiations and, in particular, to express my satisfaction at the presence here of the two co-Chairmen, Mr. Zorin and Mr. Foster.

I am also very grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for your words of welcome.

Permit me now to make a few comments on the question which is on the agenda of our meeting today. Before doing so, I should like to say a few words of a general nature. I have studied with all due attention the verbatim records of the statements that were made during the general debate last week, and I should like to stress that the representatives were unanimous in pointing out that recently, as a result of the joint efforts of many countries, it has been possible to bring about the implementation of a number of measures which have helped to reduce tension and improve the international

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atmosphere. This should be regarded as a positive factor which shows that there are practical possibilities of continuing this encouraging development.

In this connexion, it can be noted with satisfaction, judging from the statements made by delegations in the general debate, that the realization of the need to pass from words to deeds is making headway also in our Committee. We consider that this is a good omen for the next stage of our work, during which we should try to overcome the obstacles still standing in the way of achieving the desired agreement. We must do everything possible to ensure that the positive forces and trends which have been set in motion in the past months do not come to a halt but, on the contrary, continue to develop and to have an effective influence on the progress of our negotiations.

This applies above all to the basic task of our Committee -- the achievement of agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament. We have repeatedly pointed out that we consider general and complete disarmament to be the basic and indispensable prerequisite for establishing guarantees of lasting and inviolable peace. The imperative necessity of achieving agreement on general and complete disarmament constantly increases as the pace of the arms race is accelerated and there continues to exist the menace of a military conflict in which extremely destructive modern missiles and thermonuclear means of warfare would be used. We are convinced -- and this conviction of ours is growing ever stronger -- that in present-day conditions there is every possibility of concluding an agreement on general and complete disarmament and eliminating for ever the material means of warfare.

In the interests of attaining this objective we must direct all our efforts towards finding an equitable basis for an agreement on this vitally important question, and help towards opening a new and successful stage in the long history of disarmament negotiations. People all over the world are expecting from us concrete actions in the field of nuclear disarmament, such as would lead to the elimination of the still acute danger of a thermonuclear war. Neither the thousands of pages of verbatim records of the negotiations, nor general statements and assurances, are of any avail to dispel their fears, which increase with every day of the developing arms race.

We maintain the opinion, which we have reiterated here in the Committee on many occasions in the past, that positive results in the field of general and complete disarmament, as well as in the field of collateral measures, depend above all on whether agreement in principle is reached on the basic questions. In the field of general and complete disarmament such a question is undoubtedly the elimination of the

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danger of the outbreak of a thermonuclear war. Today it is generally acknowledged that the most suitable way of achieving this aim would be to eliminate nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. The destruction of these means of delivery is of crucial importance for facilitating the approach to the solution of the remaining problems connected with the preparation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

At the present stage of our negotiations the most suitable basis for reaching agreement in this regard is the Soviet proposal for the retention of a strictly limited and agreed quantity of intercontinental, anti-missile and anti-aircraft missiles together with their nuclear warheads in the arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States of America until the end of the disarmament process (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). As a number of delegations which have so far made statements have confirmed, acceptance in principle of that proposal by the Western Powers would enable us to release our negotiations from the deadlock and gradually pass on to the agreement which is so impatiently awaited by the whole of mankind.

On a number of occasions the Czechoslovak delegation has explained the reasons why it unambiguously advocates the adoption of that important proposal. We are convinced that the Soviet proposal meets the aforementioned imperative necessity of eliminating as quickly as possible the danger of outbreak of a thermonuclear war. That is its basic purport and significance.

The second basic feature of the Soviet proposal is its equitable and balanced character. This feature shows up with particular clearness when a comparison is made with the United States proposal for a percentage reduction of nuclear missile weapons during the disarmament process (ENDC/30). A percentage reduction would not ensure a solution to the problem of keeping the balance in disarmament measures, as Mr. Zorin, the leader of the Soviet delegation, has convincingly shown at today's meeting.

The delegations of the socialist countries, including my own delegation, have repeatedly proved the groundlessness of the assertion that the implementation of the Soviet proposal would place the Warsaw Treaty countries unilaterally in a more favourable position as a result of their superiority in conventional weapons, and that this would constitute a menace to the security of the countries of Western Europe. It would not be difficult, of course, to adduce in this connexion a number of quotations from statements made by Western statesmen and to show, on that basis, the groundlessness of such an argument. That, however, would be a superfluous repetition of what has already been said here on many occasions.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

Equally unfounded in relation to the Soviet proposal concerning, especially, strategic thermonuclear missiles with a range of several thousand kilometres are the objections of the Western representatives regarding the alleged advantage of the socialist countries in view of their more favourable geographical situation.

I do not intend to analyse those arguments in detail today, and in connexion with certain statements made this morning I should like to point out that we have often heard it asserted here in the Committee that, if United States nuclear missiles were to be withdrawn from the territory of Western Europe, this might bring about a threat to the security of that region or even aggression on the part of the socialist countries. We think that such an argument is highly erroneous, and that our Western colleagues are also greatly in error when they base themselves, in regard to the Soviet proposal, only on military considerations, often far-fetched, and pass over in silence the basic facts which are known to everyone.

It is no secret that the entire foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, which has found its expression not only in the declarations of their heads of State and in basic documents, but also in concrete proposals and actions, is based upon renunciation of the use or threat of force and on the principle of the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, and is aimed at reducing and eliminating international tension. The whole world knows that the socialist States have not only proclaimed but are every day consistently carrying out the idea of the peaceful co-existence of States with different social and economic systems. The same aim is pursued by all our efforts to bring about a relaxation of tension in the vulnerable, sensitive area of Central Europe, to ensure stable conditions for peaceful development, and to preclude the danger of aggression and revanche. If there is really a threat of aggression in that area, such a threat does not come from the side of the socialist States.

It seems to us that our colleagues from the Western countries should reconsider their negative attitude towards the Soviet proposal, which, we are firmly convinced, opens up a possibility of moving forward in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament. We should like to express the hope that the Western delegations will appreciate the further evidence of good will on the part of the Soviet Union, which has declared its readiness to proceed immediately to the consideration of concrete problems connected with the implementation of its proposal in an appropriate working body, if the Committee accepts as a starting-point the principle of the retention of a

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"nuclear umbrella". This is unquestionably a step towards meeting the position of the Western Powers, which in the past have repeatedly called for a discussion of the details of the Soviet proposal.

Moreover, we believe to be perfectly right the point of view that acceptance of the "nuclear umbrella" principle by the Committee should be the basis of such negotiations. We think that the consideration of the details of the proposal would thus be given a practical basis and that the prerequisites would be brought about for the speedy achievement of positive results. Acceptance of the "nuclear umbrella" principle would at the same time signify confirmation of the fact that the most urgent task within the framework of general and complete disarmament is to avert the danger of nuclear war.

The Czechoslovak delegation maintains the view that our Committee should in all earnest consider and adopt the Soviet proposal and avail itself of the possibilities which it opens up to us. That would meet the requirements of the present situation and would help towards eliminating the paradoxical situation where, on the one hand, obvious trends towards relaxing international tension are becoming stronger, while, on the other hand, we are witnessing an ever-developing nuclear arms race. The realization of the increasing need to take a decisive step in the disarmament negotiations should, in our opinion, find its expression in the achievement of agreement precisely in this field. This would merely be in accordance with the basic task assigned to our Committee.

Mr. GOMEZ ROBLEDO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): In taking the floor for the first time as Mexican representative, I wish first of all to associate myself with those who expressed their sorrow at the death of Mr. Nehru, Prime Minister of India. We in Mexico shall never forget the visit to our country of that great architect of peace and international concord. His memory will ever inspire us in our work. We ask the Indian delegation to accept our most sincere condolences for this irreparable loss and to transmit them to the people and Government of India.

Secondly, I should like to express my thanks for the welcome extended to me by the Brazilian representative in his capacity as Chairman, and by other representatives. I fully realize that those words were ultimately addressed, as was right and proper, not to me, but to the country which I represent; nevertheless, that only redoubles my gratitude.

(Mr. Gomez Robledo, Mexico)

My presence here among you is yet another indication of the great value attached by my Government to this Committee's work. Never for one moment has the Mexican seat at this Conference been vacant, for my country has always considered it a signal honour to be a member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

So far as Mexico is concerned, there has merely been a changing of the guard: there has been no change in our foreign policy, which holds that peace with justice is the greatest of human blessings, for the sake of which all difficulties and sacrifices should be faced with equanimity. We do not know whether we are far from or near our common aim of general and complete disarmament, but we must devote all our energy and all our enthusiasm to it without for one moment relaxing our efforts in this most noble task assigned to us by the United Nations.

In this first speech I do not propose to dwell on the substance of the problems at issue; a more suitable occasion will no doubt arise later on. With the permission of all those present, I should like merely to express the Mexican delegation's views on certain general points which could nevertheless enable us to make progress towards our common objective.

Without studying in detail the whole problem of disarmament since it engaged the attention of Governments and of world public opinion, and confining ourselves to our recent meetings, we find elements which give us cause for confidence, but also some which, unfortunately, give rise to a certain pessimism, due no doubt to the scanty achievements which our Committee has been able to present to the world.

Negotiation is the only way in which agreement can be reached. Thus, it was encouraging to hear, at earlier meetings, certain remarks which reveal the intentions of the Governments represented here.

On 9 June, Mr. Foster, the United States representative, repeated the words of President Johnson's message to Chairman Khrushchev at the end of last year:

"... the time for simply talking about peace ... has passed — 1964 should be a year in which we take further steps toward that goal."

(ENDC/PV.188, p.11)

(Mr. Gomez Robledo, Mexico)

For his part, Mr. Zorin said on the same occasion:

"Accordingly, in the days and weeks ahead the Soviet delegation will exert the utmost efforts to facilitate mutual understanding and ensure a movement forward in the main direction of our work -- in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament." (ibid., p.16)

Mr. Thomas, the United Kingdom representative, said at the same meeting:

"The Conference must now seize this favourable opportunity to make further progress in the hope that new agreements can be negotiated in the not too distant future". (ibid., p.20)

There is thus on the part of the nuclear Powers a desire to negotiate which we believe to be genuine. Unilateral and parallel declarations of intent, all of the same tenor, have been made. As the Mexican representative said on 15 March 1963, we continue to believe that --

"... both sides sincerely desire to reach the goal we all have in view, and we are confident that if they want the end they also want the means. The only means is negotiation; but real negotiation is a two-way road, along which both sides must move forward with the aim of meeting and the intention of arriving at a constructive settlement." (ENDC/PV.109, p.11)

We think that possibly, as other delegations have already said, the best method to make progress might be the adoption of a working programme.

In our opinion, certain ideas have been expressed here which are deserving of study by the Conference, and particularly, by our co-Chairman. Mr. Hassan, of the United Arab Republic, said at the meeting of 9 June:

"We should like to believe that we are starting a promising new stage in our deliberations, a stage where both parties will be in a position to present new contributions as a result of the complete exposition of all relevant aspects of the proposals of both parties."

Later he mentioned two points which he considered important to the organization of our work:

"The first," he said, "concerns the necessity of achieving a more disciplined discussion of the various collateral measures already presented to the Conference in order to create a more propitious opportunity for enlarging areas of possible understanding. Thus our Committee would be enabled to concentrate and to engage in a thorough exchange of views on some of the collateral measures which offer

(Mr. Gomez Robledo, Mexico)

larger possibilities for agreement, so that we could report positive and concrete agreement to the next General Assembly session. The second point relates to the usefulness of setting immediately a tentative schedule for our work during the five-month period preceding the next General Assembly session." (ENDC/PV.188 p.25)

We regard these proposals as judicious, and we are confident that the co-Chairmen will give us their views on them.

It is in this spirit, Mr. Chairman, that I offer you and all my distinguished colleagues my devoted collaboration, up to the extreme limits of my powers. I am fully aware of the grave responsibility which I have assumed in representing a State which is, in the full sense of the term, a peace-loving State.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): It had been my intention to speak at this time. However, the hour is late and, since the United States representative has asked to speak, I shall forgo doing so today.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): At the outset, I should like to make two comments.

The Soviet representative has arranged for the circulation of a letter from a Mr. Winzer as a Conference document (ENDC/133). I stated at our meeting of 4 February, when the then Soviet representative asked that a letter from the same source be circulated:

"... as far as my delegation is concerned, this letter is from a non-governmental representative or organization and as such should be treated in accordance with the procedures governing such communications". (ENDC/PV.163, pp.28, 29)

I wish to repeat that statement at this time.

I should also like to state that I regret the criticisms that the Soviet representative has levelled at the Federal Republic of Germany. These criticisms have been adequately refuted at previous meetings.

I propose now to make an initial response to the suggestion made by Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin on 9 June.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Mr. Zorin proposed that an appropriate working organ be established for detailed consideration of the problem of nuclear delivery vehicles within the framework of general and complete disarmament. He attached a condition to his participation in such a working group. That condition was that --

"... the Committee approves, as proposed by the delegation of India before the recess, ... the proposal for a 'nuclear umbrella' as a basis for the solution of the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles".

(ENDC/PV.188, p.17)

If this means that we must first accept the latest Gromyko proposal in principle, then Mr. Zorin must know that his suggestion is not acceptable to the United States. We understand the latest Gromyko proposal to require elimination of about 97 to 99 per cent of all nuclear delivery vehicles in eighteen months. This would occur without inspection for hidden vehicles and without improvement in the methods for keeping the peace. We have stated that understanding to the Conference. It has not been contradicted by the Soviet delegation. Both Mr. Fisher, when he was here, and I have made it clear that, if that was what the Gromyko proposal contemplated, the United States could not agree to it either in principle or as the basis for negotiations.

As I indicated on 11 February, such a proposal would rapidly alter in favour of the Soviet Union the present mix of armaments upon which the existing rough balance is based (ENDC/PV.165, p.22). My delegation has pointed out repeatedly that the United States is not prepared to make such immediate, drastic and unbalanced reductions in its nuclear forces -- particularly not without verification procedures to assure us that other Powers were doing the same, nor without peace-keeping institutions to prevent the use of force in the resolution of disputes. We stated flatly on 31 March that we could not --

"... accept that proposal in principle as a means of getting on with our work". (ENDC/PV.179, p.13)

Thus, if this is the Soviet condition to participation in a working group, the Soviet delegation must have known that we could not agree to such a working group. If, on the other hand, Mr. Zorin means by the phrase "nuclear umbrella" that both sides would retain an agreed portion of their nuclear vehicles to the end of the disarmament process, then we already have an agreement in principle. I made this clear on 11 February, and Sir Paul Mason has made it clear again today.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

The United States plan (ENDC/30) contemplates a "nuclear umbrella". It provides for the retention of nuclear delivery vehicles in national arsenals to the end of the disarmament process. The United States plan is designed to accomplish the elimination of such vehicles on both sides within a reasonable time frame in a manner fully consistent with the Agreed Principles. It proceeds in orderly and balanced fashion. It does not attempt the elimination of 97 to 99 per cent of all nuclear delivery vehicles in one short stage. Procedures to assure against clandestine violations and to strengthen peace-keeping institutions would be carried out in all three stages.

In spite of Mr. Zorin's charges to the contrary today, we firmly believe that a plan such as this is the most practical way of attaining our objective. For this reason, we do not propose to withdraw the United States proposal from consideration by this Conference. It may be that the Soviet representative did not have in mind the exclusion of the United States and other plans from study by the working group he has proposed. If this is the basis on which the Soviet delegation has suggested a working group, then we welcome the proposal as a step forward.

With that in mind, I make the following response for my Government to Mr. Zorin's suggestion.

First, we agree to the establishment of a technical working group to deal with the problem of nuclear delivery vehicles.

Second, the terms of reference of the working group should be consistent with the appropriate item of the agreed procedure of work for general and complete disarmament. That item, number 5 (b), includes --

"Disarmament measures in regard to nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, including the problems pertaining to the production of such vehicles, together with appropriate control measures...". (ENDC/52, p.2)

Third, all proposals and considerations relevant to this agenda item should be open for discussion in such a working group.

We believe that such a working group could give real impetus to one of the most significant areas of our work here. The Committee will never get far in solving this important problem unless, as has been said this morning, it moves from generalities to details. To move ahead, we need agreement on specific proposals, as well as on general principles. With the help of specialists who understand the intricate nature of nuclear delivery vehicles and their impact upon the present balance between the two sides, greater progress should indeed be possible.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): The representative of Italy has asked for the floor to exercise the right of reply.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I shall be very brief, but I really must reply to Mr. Zorin's remarks on the speech which I made today. He did not find it entirely negative, for which I thank him. He said, however, that I was mistaken in my observations on the Soviet delegation's position, which, according to him, had not changed, while the Western delegations had allegedly changed theirs for the better, being inspired to a greater extent by a desire for collaboration.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that there is really something good about this Conference's atmosphere. The parties to a negotiation usually accuse each other of too much rigidity. Here, on the contrary, we have been congratulating each other this morning on the favourable dispositions displayed on either side during our talks. My delegation has been pleased to discern a more constructive attitude on the part of the Soviet delegation as regards our method of work, while the Soviet delegation believes that the Western Powers have taken up a more accommodating position as regards general and complete disarmament.

Perhaps it would be better to be content with this mutual appreciation which augurs well for our future talks. However, after the very kind, albeit critical, remarks of Mr. Zorin, I should not like to give the impression of having completely lost my memory, particularly as I have had the privilege of participating with Mr. Zorin in the Geneva negotiations since the very beginning. Mr. Zorin said this morning that at the outset the Western delegations were opposed to general and complete disarmament and that it was only later that they modified their attitude.

In my turn, I should like to remind Mr. Zorin that general and complete disarmament was proposed for the first time at the United Nations in 1959 in a speech by the British Prime Minister, and that the Western Powers voted in 1959 in favour of the resolution on general and complete disarmament and the institution of the Geneva Conference (A/RES/1378(XIV)), thus clearly demonstrating their wishes. The five Western Powers members of the Geneva Conference submitted on 15 March 1960 a complete and detailed draft plan for general and complete disarmament in three stages which is to be found in the Conference's records (ENDC/30/Add.2).

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

But at the same time, we have since 1960 been insisting on the need for a gradual and progressive approach to disarmament problems, particularly through the immediate adoption of certain limited and partial disarmament agreements. It was that system of negotiations which the Soviet delegation did not at first wish to accept. I need only recall the nuclear test ban agreement. The partial ban on nuclear tests was proposed by the Western delegations in August 1962 (ENDC/59). At that time the Soviet reply was negative: either a total ban or none at all. But, later, to our great satisfaction, the Soviet reply became positive, and thus it was that in August 1963 we concluded an agreement on a partial test ban.

I do not wish to cite other examples or press this point. In any case it is comforting and encouraging that each side considers the other's attitude to the main problems to be more constructive and inspired by a greater desire for collaboration. We therefore hope that, thanks to this state of mind, the mountain-climbing excursion to which Mr. Zorin once more invited us today will be easy and blessed by a serene and cloudless sky.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I now have an important announcement to make on behalf of the two co-Chairmen. The text is as follows:

"The co-Chairmen recommend to the Committee that, in considering questions relating to general and complete disarmament, it devote the next several of its meetings to a discussion of items 5(b) and 5(c) of the agreed agenda (ENDC/52), taking into account all relevant proposals, including those contained in documents ENDC/2/Rev.1, ENDC/30, and ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1. At a later date the co-Chairmen will develop recommendations concerning the further work of the Committee on questions relating to general and complete disarmament."

In the absence of any comments, I take it that the Committee agrees to the recommendations of the co-Chairmen.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 190th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador U Sain Bwa, representative of Burma.

"The Conference stood in silence and all delegations and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General paid tribute to the memory of the late Charles C. Stelle, former representative of the United States.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Italy, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Mexico and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 18 June 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.40 p.m.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.190/Corr.1

July 1964

ENGLISH & FRENCH

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

SEP 10 1964

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

CORRECTION TO THE

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETIETH MEETING

Page 25, second paragraph, eighth and ninth lines, instead of :

"... general and complete disarmament on the whole work of the
Committee ..." read :

"... the whole work of the Committee on general and complete
disarmament."

--- eleventh and twelfth lines, instead of :

"the question of preparing a treaty on general and complete
disarmament on the Committee's work." read :

"... the Committee's work on the question of preparing a treaty
on general and complete disarmament."

